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This article examines the multiple eﬀects of cognitive diversity in teams
operating complex human-machine-systems. The study employed a PC-based
multiple-task environment, called the Cabin Air Management System, which
models a process control task in the operational context of a spacecraft’s
life support system. Two types of cognitive diversity were examined: system
understanding and team specialization. System understanding referred
to the depth of understanding team members were given during training
(low-level procedure-oriented vs. high level knowledge-oriented training).
Team specialization referred to the degree to which knowledge about system
fault scenarios was distributed between team members (specialized vs. non-
specialized). A total of 72 participants took part in the study. After having
received 4.5 h of training on an individual basis, participants completed a 1-h
experimental session, in which they worked in two-person teams on a series of
fault scenarios of varying diﬃculty. Measures were taken of primary and
secondary task performance, system intervention and information sampling
strategies, system knowledge, subjective operator state, communication
patterns and conﬂict. The results provided evidence for the beneﬁts of
cognitive diversity with regard to system understanding. This manifested
itself in better primary task performance and more eﬃcient manual system
control. No advantages were found for cognitive diversity with regard to
specialization. There was no eﬀect of cognitive diversity on intra-team
conﬂict, with conﬂict levels generally being very low. The article concludes
with a discussion of the implications of the ﬁndings for the engineering of
cognitive diversity in teams operating complex human-machine-systems.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Teamwork in complex technical work environments
Teamwork is a common feature in a number of technical work environments, such as
aircraft cockpits, nuclear power plants and ship’s bridges. In most of these teams,
performance is a critical issue since it is associated with system safety and productivity.
There is an extensive body of literature on the performance of work teams (e.g. Cordery
2002). This literature has looked at a range of factors that are associated with team
performance, such as job design, interdependence, team processes, team context and
team composition. One aspect of team composition refers to the diﬀerences between team
members (TMs) or, put diﬀerently, the degree of diversity within a team. The present
article is concerned with the question of how the performance of two-person teams
working with complex technical systems is aﬀected by within-team diversity.
Within the literature on team diversity, two main research strands can be identiﬁed.
One is concerned with the importance of shared mental models between TMs
(i.e. reducing within-team diversity) managing highly complex technical systems
(e.g. Cannon-Bowers et al. 1993). The other is concerned with increasing team diversity
as a means to improve overall team performance (e.g. Webber and Donahue 2001). The
two research strands are characterized by somewhat opposing basic assumptions, with
the former emphasizing the importance of similarity of TMs with regard to their mental
model while the latter stresses the beneﬁts of having diﬀerences between TMs to improve
overall team performance. The strands also diﬀer with regard to the dominant task
environment in which the research is carried out. The literature on shared mental model
largely focuses on teamwork during the use of technical systems while the diversity
literature is more concerned with decision-making in management and project teams.
However, both research strands are united in pursuing the critical question about the
optimal degree of team diversity under given situational circumstances. For the present
study, relevant work from both research strands is examined.
1.2. Cognitive diversity in teams
Diﬀerences between members of a team are often referred to as ‘diversity’ (Jackson et al.
1995). Since TMs can diﬀer from one another in many attributes, diversity is considered a
multifaceted concept (Stumpf and Thomas 1999). In a model by McGrath et al. (1995)
attributes of diversity in teams are assigned into ﬁve clusters: (i) demographic attributes
(e.g. age, gender, functional background); (ii) task-related knowledge, skills and abilities;
(iii) values, beliefs and attitudes; (iv) personality and cognitive and behavioural styles;
(v) status in the work group’s embedding organization (e.g. organizational rank).
The clusters are not independent of each other. For example, diversity in demographic
factors such as functional background is linked to diﬀerences in task-related attributes,
such as knowledge, skills and abilities. The multifaceted nature of diversity is also
reﬂected in a model by Jackson (1996), which classiﬁes diversity in work groups into
two bipolar dimensions: (a) readily detected attributes vs. underlying attributes;
and (b) task-related attributes vs. relationship-oriented attributes. This results in a
two-by-two table, into which TM attributes can be assigned. An example for an
underlying and task-related attribute would be knowledge and expertise of the work
team, whereas gender would be a relationship-oriented and readily detected attribute.
The present paper is concerned with diversity in underlying and task-related attributes,
such as abilities, knowledge, expertise and problem-solving strategies. In theories of
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information processing and decision-making, these attributes are often described as
particularly relevant for team performance (Milliken and Martins 1996, Williams and
O’Reilly 1998). Because of their cognitive nature, the term ‘cognitive diversity’ will be
used to refer to within-team diﬀerences in these attributes.
Evidence from the research literature suggests that the relationship between cognitive
diversity and team performance is of considerable complexity, as it may be aﬀected
by a number of moderating variables (Milliken and Martins 1996, Shaw and Barrett-
Power 1998, Williams and O’Reilly 1998). McGrath et al. (1995) have identiﬁed three
factors that may moderate that relationship: work group characteristics; technology; and
task.
. Work group characteristics: Work teams diﬀer with regard to their underlying
function (e.g. operating a human-machine-system, working on a time-limited project).
McGrath et al. (1995) have argued that teams operating human-machine-systems
(called crews in their terminology) beneﬁt less from team diversity than other forms
of work groups, such as task forces and management teams. This is largely due
to the standardized way of completing task activities often found in teams
operating technical systems. However, there are also situations with lower levels
of standardization (e.g. emergencies), in which team diversity would be more
advantageous.
. Technology: McGrath et al. (1995) refer to communication technology as an
inﬂuencing factor. While communication technology is of importance, there are
much broader technological issues that need to be looked at, too. Technical sys-
tems may diﬀer with regard to a number of factors, such as application area
(e.g. transportation, process control), system complexity (e.g. time lags) and task
interdependence. The underlying logic of the application area determines the level of
team diversity required. For example, while considerable overlap between the
knowledge structures of TMs is typically found in civilian aircraft (i.e. low diversity),
space crews are much more diverse because of diﬀerences in crew member
qualiﬁcation (e.g. physician, engineer).
. Task: The importance of the task type as a moderator of the relationship be-
tween team diversity and performance is stressed by several authors (Shaw and
Barrett-Power 1998, Williams and O’Reilly 1998). For example, tasks that involve the
solving of complex problems beneﬁt more from task-related diversity than less
complex tasks (Mohammed and Ringseis 2001). In the present study, tasks of
diﬀerent complexity levels were examined to identify any diﬀerential eﬀects of
cognitive diversity.
Although cognitive diversity may provide beneﬁts for team performance, it also
involves the risk of incurring process losses that may partly oﬀset these advantages. This
has been coined the ‘double-edged sword’’ of team diversity (Milliken and Martins 1996).
The potential for conﬂict in highly diverse groups has been considered such a risk
factor for process losses (Williams and O’Reilly 1998). Empirical work has found that
certain aspects of diversity were connected to certain types of conﬂict (Pelled et al. 1999).
For example, diversity in task-related aspects (e.g. professional background) was
associated with task-related conﬂict but not with emotional conﬂict. Conversely, diversity
in relationship-oriented attributes (e.g. age) was associated with emotional conﬂict but
not with task-related conﬂict. Overall, task-related conﬂict is not necessarily undesirable
since it may result in better decisions (Priem et al. 1995).
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While most of the work on team diversity has been carried out in a non-technical work
context, a smaller number of studies has also been conducted in the context of complex
technical work environments. That work may be summarized under the heading of
‘shared mental models’, as it examines to what extent a strong overlap of TMs’ mental
models is of beneﬁt for team performance. The studies have been conducted in a range of
settings, such as simulated military applications (e.g. Stout et al. 1999, Cooke et al. 2003),
air traﬃc control (e.g. Tschan et al. 2000) but also in generic laboratory settings
(e.g. Banks and Millward 2000). The ﬁndings from these studies generally suggest that a
strongly shared mental model is advantageous for team performance.
However, not all aspects of the mental model need to be shared to the same extent.
Cannon-Bowers et al. (1993) have argued that it is very important that the following
aspects of a mental model are shared: task (e.g. managing system faults); team interaction
(e.g. communication); and team resources (e.g. knowledge about team mate’s abilities and
skills). However, it is less critical that there is a strong overlap for the mental model of
the equipment (i.e. knowledge about system). Another distinction was made by Rouse
and Morris (1986) between rapidly evolving dimensions of the mental model (e.g. current
state of the system) and temporally more stable dimensions (e.g. system function, form
and purpose). The current state of the system shows considerable variation over time
since this aspect of the mental model evolves with the changing situation. Whilst the
reviewed work from the literature has been primarily concerned with the mental model
of the current system state, the present study focuses on the temporally more stable
dimensions of the mental model. While a high degree of mental model overlap appears to
be beneﬁcial with regard to the current system state, it remains to be empirically tested
whether this would also apply to temporally more stable aspects of the mental model.
In particular, it needs to be examined how team performance is aﬀected if there are
diﬀerences in the performance potential of individual TMs. A classiﬁcation system by
Steiner (1972) proposes several principles, according to which group task performance is
determined by the performance potential of each TM. First, the disjunctive task principle
may apply, which proposes that the best TM determines overall team eﬀectiveness.
Second, the compensatory task principle may apply, suggesting that the performance of
single TMs is averaged. Third, the conjunctive task principle may apply, which proposes
that team performance equals the performance of the worst TM. Cognitive diversity in
teams would only be beneﬁcial if the disjunctive task principle applied.
1.3. The present study
In the present study, a complex work environment was modelled by means of a
computer-based simulation, which is suitable for performance tests for individuals as well
as teams. The good data-gathering facilities of the simulation environment permitted the
collection of performance measures on a range of task components. This is in contrast to
most previous studies examining team diversity, which did not collect any performance
measures or needed to rely on self-assessed performance alone. In addition to per-
formance measures, important supplementary measures were collected to assess the
multiple eﬀects of cognitive diversity, such as information sampling and control
behaviour, subjective operator state, system knowledge, team perception, conﬂict and
communication patterns.
The current study used training as a means to create cognitive diversity within teams.
Of the many facets of cognitive diversity, this study examined two aspects: system
understanding and specialization.
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The main independent variable examined was the type of system understanding,
which refers to the level of understanding operators had of the system functions
(e.g. components, cause–eﬀect relationships between parameters, constraints of opera-
tions). This was an important aspect because creating an eﬀective mental model of the
operator has long been considered a principal factor for optimizing the human-machine-
system. In the ﬁrst experimental group, both TMs were provided with a deep
understanding of the system (system-oriented training; SOT). In the second group
(procedure-oriented training; POT), both TMs were given precise procedures to follow
when a system disturbance occurred. These two homogeneous groups were compared to a
third group (mixed; MIX), in which a system-trained and a procedure-trained TM were
paired up, hence representing a diverse group with regard to their understanding of the
system. The design of the training regimes to achieve diﬀerent levels of system
understanding was based on a distinction by Morris and Rouse (1985), who identiﬁed
two forms of training (guidance in the use of system knowledge, guidance in the use of
rules or algorithms) as more eﬀective than alternative training regimes. Based on
that theoretical distinction, two training regimes have been developed in an earlier
study (Sauer et al. 2000a), upon which the training regimes used in the present work were
based.
A further independent variable in the present study referred to the degree of TM
specialization. Since training time is at a premium in many work environments, an
eﬀective allocation of resources is required. Against this background, this study
addressed the question of whether an operator should only be trained on the management
of a selected set of possible fault scenarios (e.g. those with a higher frequency) or
should the operator be given a very broad introduction to all possible fault scenarios?
If there is a focus on a selected set, the operator might beneﬁt from overtraining (Patrick
1992), although this may be at the expense of knowledge transfer problems to unfamiliar
fault states. In technical systems managed by a single operator, one may be inclined to
opt for a broader introduction to fault scenarios to ensure that the operator is not
confronted with unfamiliar fault states, which he/she may not be able to manage.
However, in the context of teamwork one can also see the beneﬁts of stronger
specialization since TMs are able to complement each other in their ﬁelds of expertise.
Against this background, the present study examined whether a low or high level of
specialization would be more advantageous for team performance. In one condition,
TMs would have a broad but less profound knowledge of fault scenarios (i.e. low
specialization of TMs because their knowledge strongly overlapped). In the other
condition, each TM’s knowledge would be limited to a small set of possible fault
scenarios, but for these selected faults scenarios knowledge would be much more
profound than in the other condition (i.e. high specialization of TMs because their
knowledge of fault scenarios did not overlap).
On the basis of the research literature reviewed, a number of predictions were made.
First, a complex pattern of eﬀect was expected for diversity in system understanding. It
was predicted that the homogeneous teams (SOT and POT) were particularly eﬀective
under speciﬁc operational conditions. SOT would show better primary task performance
than POT at the most diﬃcult fault scenarios. This was because of their deeper
understanding of the task environment, which enabled SOT-teams to transfer their better
knowledge to unfamiliar situations more easily. Conversely, it was hypothesized that
POT-teams showed better primary task performance than SOT-teams on familiar faults
because the former were more familiar with the application of eﬀective procedures.
Whilst directed expectations were put forward for the homogeneous POT and
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SOT-teams, no such clear predictions were made for diverse teams. It may be that
the best TM in this MIX team would determine team performance (i.e. the disjunctive
task principle of Steiner’s classiﬁcation system applies) or, alternatively, any of the two
other principles (conjunctive or compensatory) may apply. Therefore, an important goal
of this piece of research was to determine which principle would be most likely to apply.
Second, with regard to team specialization, it was predicted that specialized teams would
perform better than non-specialized teams at familiar fault scenarios because the
specialized TM had more experience of dealing with the system fault than a TM who
received a broader introduction to system faults. Third, the eﬀects of cognitive
diversity were expected to be task dependent in that more complex tasks (e.g. fault
diagnosis) would beneﬁt more from diversity than less complex tasks (e.g. alarm
acknowledgement).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
A total of 72 participants (8.3% female) took part in the study. All of them were students
from science and engineering departments of Darmstadt University of Technology.
This was to ensure that they had a satisfactory understanding of technical systems,
similar to operators of real technical systems. Their ages ranged from 20 to 40 years
(mean 24.5 years). Participants received a payment of e50 for their involvement.
2.2. Design
A 36 26 4 mixed design was employed in the experiment, with two between-
participants variables (system understanding, specialization) and one within-participants
variable (diﬃculty of fault scenario). System understanding was manipulated at three
levels (POT, SOT and MIX, i.e. POT for one TM and SOT for the other) whilst
specialization was varied at two levels (specialized teams vs. non-specialized teams).
Within each 1-h testing period, four levels of the factor ‘diﬃculty of fault scenario’ were
included: fault-free (F-free); practised faults (PracF); novel faults (NovF); control panel
failures (CPF). Since the unit of analysis was a two-person team (i.e. 72 participants
formed 36 teams), each of the six cells contained six cases.
The variable ‘scenario diﬃculty’ was varied at four levels: (i) In the F-free condition,
the automatic system was perfectly reliable; (ii) PracF referred to fault states that
participants had already extensively practised during the training sessions; (iii) NovF
were fault states that participants had not encountered before but they were of the same
quality as the practised faults; (iv) CPF referred to a group of faults that were much more
diﬃcult to manage than those practised in training. This was because the most obvious
strategy of dealing with them was unavailable (i.e. the control panel that was necessary to
manage the fault was out of order). Furthermore, it was not possible to repair the fault
since the maintenance facility was also unavailable.
2.3. Simulation task
In this study, a task environment was employed that modelled a highly automated
process control environment in the operational context of a spacecraft’s life support
system. The task environment, known by the name of Cabin Air Management System
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(CAMS), consists of ﬁve automatic controllers that maintain their corresponding system
parameters (O2, CO2, cabin pressure, temperature and humidity) within a predeﬁned
target range. The main interface of CAMS may be found in ﬁgure 1. This screenshot
displays the topographical layout of the system with its principal features, comprising
history display, parameter control panels, maintenance facility, alarm system and ﬂow
meter readings.
The operator is required to complete four tasks, which are divided into primary and
secondary tasks according to the priorities attached to them. The two primary tasks are
system stabilization and fault diagnosis. Maintaining a stable system state is achieved by
monitoring the safe functioning of the automatic controllers and, if required in the event
of a system fault, by adopting manual control. Fault diagnosis refers to the identiﬁcation
and repair of system faults by making use of the CAMS maintenance facility. The two
secondary tasks are responding to system alarms and carrying out status checks at regular
intervals. The acknowledgement of system alarms was a reaction time task that measured
the response latency of operators. The status of the O2 tanks had to be checked regularly
(i.e. at 3-min intervals), which represented essentially a prospective memory task.
In addition to these performance measures, CAMS also allowed the collection of
data on diﬀerent aspects of the subjective state of the operator, including mental
eﬀort, anxiety and fatigue. This was done at 30-min intervals by means of visual
analogue scales (100 mm lines), which were embedded in the CAMS environment. All
system and operator responses are automatically written into a results ﬁle, allowing
the reconstruction of an experimental session for further analysis. A detailed description
of CAMS may be found in Sauer et al. (2000b).
Figure 1. Main interface of Cabin Air Management System.
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2.4. Training
Participants were randomly assigned to one of four training conditions, which consisted
of two dimensions with two levels each: specialization (specialized vs. non-specialized);
system understanding (procedure- vs. system-oriented). As the two dimensions were
completely crossed, four diﬀerent training conditions emerged, such as high specialization
combined with system-orientation or low-specialization combined with procedure-
orientation (see table 1). The precise content of each training approach is described
below.
Since the CAMS task was of considerable complexity, the participants received
extensive training in small groups of three to four. Total training time was approximately
4.5 h, given in two separate sessions. In the ﬁrst session (2.5 h), participants were
taught about the basic operation of CAMS and the set of tasks they had to complete
during the experimental session. After having worked with CAMS during normal sys-
tem operation, participants received extensive practice on a set of system faults. In the
second training session (2 h), more intensive practice on these system faults was given.
A fault ﬁnding guide was provided to all participants, which they could consult
during training and the experimental testing session. The training approach was
highly interactive, with the participants completing especially designed training
scenarios on individual computers. At the end of the training programme, a 7-min
performance test was given to determine whether participants had received acceptable
performance levels. All participants reached satisfactory standards and none had to be
excluded.
2.4.1. Specialization. In specialized teams, each TM was intensively trained on three
fault states, with each fault scenario being practised six times. A TM would either be
trained on set A of fault states (i.e. leak of O2 valve, block of N2 valve, vent permanently
open) or on set B (i.e. CO2 scrubber ineﬀective, set point failure of N2 controller,
O2 valve permanently open). For the experiment, a TM trained on set A would be paired
up with a TM trained on set B so that they would complement each other with regard
to their familiarity with a complete set of six system faults. In non-specialized
teams, each TM was trained on the complete set of all six faults (i.e. both TMs
received exactly the same training) before they were paired up for the experimental
session. Because non-specialized TMs were introduced to more fault states than
specialized TMs, non-specialized TMs had less intensive practice on each of them,
only facing each fault state three times during training (i.e. half as often as the
specialized TMs).
Table 1. Design of training conditions.
Type of system understanding
Procedure-oriented training System-oriented training
Specialization
Specialists or n¼ 18 or n¼ 18
Generalists n¼ 18 n¼ 18
Filled symbol ¼ system-oriented training; open symbol ¼ procedure-oriented training; full circle ¼
generalists; two half circles ¼ specialists.
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2.4.2. System understanding. A total of 36 participants were given POT and 36 partici-
pants received SOT.
The POT approach focused on the importance of procedures for system management.
The instructor explained these procedures to the trainee, who had to follow them strictly
during task completion. If the trainee adopted a diﬀerent system management strategy,
the instructor would intervene and stress the importance of the correct procedure being
followed. No explanations were given to the trainee about how subsystems interact with
each other or how system parameters are aﬀected by fault states. If questions were asked
to gain a deeper system understanding, it was emphasized that the most eﬃcient way of
managing CAMS was to follow the procedures precisely as taught during training and as
outlined in the fault ﬁnding guide.
The SOT approach focused on the relationship and interaction between diﬀerent
system components. Trainees should make their interventions on the basis of their
understanding of the cause of the problem rather than simply following the step-by-step
procedures from the fault ﬁnding guide. Participants were permanently encouraged to
make a priori predictions about system behaviour and to give a posteriori explanations
after having observed actual system behaviour. The instructor would directly challenge
explanations given by trainees if they deviated from the actual processes of the system.
2.5. Experimental procedure
For the experimental testing session, participants were assigned to two-person teams
according to the experimental plan (see table 2). The experimenter ensured that teams
were not formed with participants who had met prior to taking part in the experiment.
During the 1-h experimental session, the teams had to deal with eight fault scenarios
(four PracF, two NovF and two CPF), following a schedule that was known only to the
experimenter.
TMs were told that they should work on the task scenarios together as equal partners.
One of the TMs was put in charge of the mouse and keyboard for 30 min and then they
changed so that the other TM was in charge of the controls for the remaining 30 min.
This functional role was strictly deﬁned and changed halfway through the experiment to
achieve an equal contribution as possible from the TMs over the session.
The session was videotaped for subsequent analysis of communication patterns.
A content analysis of intra-team communication (see Mayring 1988) was carried out,
Table 2. Experimental conditions.
Type of system understanding
POT-team
(two POT-TMs)
SOT-team
(two SOT-TMs)
Mixed team
(one POT-TM,
one POT-TM)
Team specialization Generalist Specialist Generalist Specialist Generalist Specialist
Number of teams 6 6 6 6 6 6
Team composition
POT¼ procedure-oriented training; SOT¼ system-oriented training; TM¼ team member; ﬁlled symbol¼
system-oriented training; open symbol¼ procedure-oriented training; full circle¼ generalists; two half
circles¼ specialists.
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with communication units being assigned to one of the following categories: (i) fault
diagnosis (causes of a disturbed system state); (ii) intervention measures (control actions
to stabilize the system); (iii) CAMS task (technical environment and its components);
(iv) secondary task; (v) training (kind of training received); (vi) allocation of tasks
(how should tasks be allocated within the team); (vii) personal matters; (viii) other.
A communicative act was deﬁned as a statement made that referred to one of the topic
categories (e.g. ‘This must be an oxygen leak!’). However, short utterances, such as ‘good’
or ‘yeah’ were not considered as communicative acts since their meaning has often
remained unclear. A sample of each tape was analysed, including three diﬀerent fault
scenarios (one PracF and two CPF). This made it possible to make a comparison between
diﬀerent levels of fault diﬃculty and to examine the eﬀects of the functional role of the
TM. The videotape analysis was carried out by a rater who was unaware of the study’s
research questions but was familiar with the task environment CAMS to be able to make
sense of participant statements. To ensure the objectivity of the content analysis, inter-
rater agreement was determined by employing a second rater on sub-samples of the
videotape material. The inter-rater reliability coeﬃcient (Cohen’s Kappa) calculated
provided a satisfactory result (K¼ 0.66).
After the completion of the working session, a set of three tests and questionnaires was
given to participants in the following order:
1. To measure the TM’s explicit (i.e. verbalizable) system knowledge, a test of user
knowledge about CAMS was applied. The test had already been used in previous
studies employing the CAMS task to assess the system knowledge of the participants
(Sauer et al. 2000a). It comprised 12 three-alternative, multiple-choice items
(e.g. What happens to the cabin temperature when nitrogen is pumped into the
cabin? (a) increase, (b) decrease or (c) no eﬀect) and three open questions about
technical subsystems (a question each about O2, pressure and temperature control,
such as: Please explain which components or processes have an impact on cabin
oxygen levels and describe the direction of that relationship).
2. A team evaluation questionnaire was especially developed for evaluating various
aspects of teamwork. Comprising 17 items, the questionnaire had four sub-scales:
(i) task engagement of participant and of team mate (six items); (ii) competence of
participant and of team mate (two items); (iii) overall team behaviour (three items);
(iv) perceived level of team diversity (three items). A 5-point Likert scale was used
for all items. An example of an item was: My approach to system management was
diﬀerent from my team mate’s (strongly agree/agree/neither agree nor disagree/
disagree/strongly disagree).
3. A German-language questionnaire (FAKT) was used to measure social conﬂict
within the team. The FAKT-questionnaire measures diﬀerent facets of social conﬂict
(Windel et al. 1999, Adolph 2000). The number of items was reduced from 54 to 26 to
exclude those items that were not applicable to teams in experimental settings.
3. Results
3.1. Primary task performance
3.1.1. System control failures. This measure refers to the percentage of time any of the
ﬁve key parameters had been in an unsafe state. The data underwent a logarithmic
transformation to stabilize variances. The data (untransformed values) are presented in
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table 3. The F-free condition was not included in the analysis since virtually no errors
were committed under that condition. The data showed a main eﬀect of system
understanding (F¼ 4.81; df¼ 2, 30; p5 0.05). Post-hoc least signiﬁcant diﬀerence
(LSD)-tests indicated that performance for MIX and system-trained teams was
signiﬁcantly better than for procedure trained teams (p5 0.05). Surprisingly, the results
showed better performance for non-specialized teams (i.e. generalists) than for
specialized teams (F¼ 4.34; df¼ 1, 30; p5 0.05). No interaction between the two types
of cognitive diversity was observed (F5 1). There was an eﬀect of fault scenario diﬃculty
in the predicted direction, with control errors increasing with more diﬃcult fault
scenarios (PracF 3.4%; NovF 6.0%; CPF 10.3%; F¼ 91.9; df¼ 2, 60; p5 0.001).
No interaction between scenario diﬃculty and any of the other independent variables
was observed.
3.1.2. Fault diagnosis. The eﬃciency of fault diagnosis was evaluated by analysing the
time needed for a correct diagnosis and repair. CPF were not included in this analysis
because the maintenance facility was not available for that fault type. The data are
presented in table 3. As for the system control failures, the analysis revealed a main eﬀect
of system understanding (F¼ 4.33; df¼ 2, 30; p5 0.05). MIX- and SOT-teams repaired
system faults more quickly than POT-teams (LSD-test: p5 0.05). No eﬀect of team
specialization was found (F5 1). A main eﬀect of scenario diﬃculty was found (F¼ 20.3;
df¼ 1, 30; p5 0.001), with NovF requiring signiﬁcantly longer to be identiﬁed than
PracF (137.1 s vs. 90.8 s). No interaction was found.
3.2. Secondary task performance
3.2.1. Prospective memory (tank level recording). This measure indicates the percentage
of prospective memory failures (i.e. responses omitted or more than 20 s after scheduled
time). The analysis revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of scenario diﬃculty (F-free 28.5%;
PracF 48.2%; NovF 41.0%; CPF 39.6%; F¼ 3.61; df¼ 3, 90; p5 0.05). Post-hoc
LSD-tests indicated that only the diﬀerence between F-free and the other three fault
conditions was signiﬁcant (p5 0.05). No signiﬁcant eﬀect of system understanding was
observed (F¼ 1.25; df¼ 2, 30; p4 0.05) and there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between
specialized and non-specialized groups (F¼ 1.80; df¼ 1, 30; p4 0.05).
3.2.2. Reaction time (annunciator acknowledgement). This measure refers to the time
needed to respond to the appearance of an annunciator. There was no signiﬁcant eﬀect
of system understanding (F5 1) and no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between generalists and
Table 3. Performance as a function of team specialization and system understanding.
System-oriented
training
Procedure-oriented
training
Mixed
team Overall
System control failures (%) 6.48 7.26 5.99
Team specialization 7.11 7.53 6.15 6.93
No team specialization 5.85 6.99 5.84 6.23
Diagnosis time (s) 100.8 137.5 104.7
Team specialization 96.3 136.4 106.3 113.0
No team specialization 105.3 138.7 101.1 115.0
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specialists (F5 1). However, there were indications of reaction time slowing down when
scenario diﬃculty increased (F-free 1.60 s; PracF 1.91 s; NovF 1.86 s; CPF 1.95s;
F¼ 5.28; df¼ 3, 90; p5 0.005). LSD-tests indicated that only the diﬀerences between
F-free and the other fault scenarios were signiﬁcant (p5 0.01).
3.3. Control actions and information sampling behaviour
3.3.1. Control actions. This measure indicates the frequency of system interventions
carried out by the team (no./min). The analysis revealed that SOT-teams (1.60/min)
intervened more frequently than POT-teams (1.11/min) or MIX-teams (1.09/min).
This diﬀerence between SOT and the two other conditions was signiﬁcant (F¼ 7.85;
df¼ 2, 30; p5 0.005; LSD-test: p5 0.001). In particular, during the presence of CPF, the
SOT-team carried out more interventions than the other teams, resulting in a signiﬁcant
interaction between system understanding and scenario diﬃculty (F¼ 5.67; df¼ 4, 60;
p5 0.001), as the data in ﬁgure 2 demonstrate. A strong main eﬀect of scenario diﬃculty
was also observed, with teams carrying out more control actions during the presence of
CPF than NovF or PracF (F¼ 26.8; df¼ 2, 30; p5 0.001; LSD-tests: p5 0.001),
although the interaction was clearly more interesting. No eﬀect of specialization was
recorded (F5 1).
3.3.2. Flow meter sampling. An analysis of the sampling frequency of ﬂow meters (they
remained visible on screen for a period of 10 s when evoked) revealed no signiﬁcant
eﬀects of cognitive diversity, neither for specialization (F5 1) nor for system
Figure 2. Control action as a function of system understanding and fault scenario.
CPF¼ control panel failures; PracF¼ practised faults; NovF¼novel faults; SOT¼
system-oriented training; POT¼ procedure-oriented training; MIX¼mixed teams.
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understanding (F¼ 1.13; df¼ 2, 30; p4 0.05). However, a strong eﬀect of scenario diﬃ-
culty was found (F¼ 50.6; df¼ 3, 90; p5 0.001), with sampling frequencies decreasing
with increasing scenario diﬃculty (F-free 2.04/min; PracF 1.66/min; NovF 1.54/min;
CPF 1.02/min). No interactions were found.
3.3.3. History display sampling. This measure indicated the percentage of time during
which the history display was shown on screen (when evoked, it remained visible for
a period of 30 s). Overall, it was on-screen for 75.7% of the time, although there was
little diﬀerence between experimental diversity conditions (all F5 1). A strong main
eﬀect of fault scenario was found (F¼ 23.6; df¼ 3, 90; p5 0.001), with a higher sampling
rate during fault-free phases (80.9%) than the other three (PracF 74.8%; NovF 73.3%;
CPF 73.8%). This was conﬁrmed by LSD-tests (p5 0.001).
3.4. Subjective operator state and team evaluation
3.4.1. Subjective operator state. As an embedded feature of CAMS, the subjective state
of the participants was measured at 30-min intervals. Responses were made on 100-mm
visual analogue scales for three variables: eﬀort, anxiety and fatigue. No eﬀect was found
for any of the two types of cognitive diversity on mental eﬀort expenditure, anxiety and
fatigue (for all F5 1). However, ratings increased for all three measures, as the
experimental session progressed. The data are presented in ﬁgure 3. Mean team ratings of
mental eﬀort increased from T30 (þ30 min) to T60 (þ60 min) signiﬁcantly (F¼ 20.4;
df¼ 1, 30; p5 0.001). A similar pattern was found for anxiety, with team ratings also
monotonously increasing over the three points of measurement, with the ﬁrst being taken
prior to the beginning of the session. This eﬀect was highly signiﬁcant (F¼ 25.1;
df¼ 2, 60; p5 0.001), with LSD-tests conﬁrming that all three levels were diﬀerent from
each other (p5 0.01). Fatigue showed largely the same pattern, with TMs becoming
increasingly tired, as the session progressed (F¼ 4.31; df¼ 2, 60; p5 0.05). Here, only the
diﬀerence between T0 and T60 was signiﬁcant (LSD-test: p5 0.05).
3.4.2. Within-team analysis. An additional within-team analysis was carried out to
determine whether the functional role within the team aﬀected the operational state of the
participant. This was achieved by entering functional role as an additional independent
variable into the ANOVA. The results showed that the role of the controller
(i.e. participant using the mouse and keyboard) was associated with higher subjective
state ratings on all three measures than the role of the co-controller (i.e. participant not
using the mouse and keyboard). When the participants swapped their roles halfway
through the experiment, ratings changed accordingly. The eﬀects of functional role
were highly signiﬁcant for mental eﬀort (F¼ 41.5; df¼ 1, 30; p5 0.001) and anxiety
(F¼ 32.5; df¼ 1, 30; p5 0.001), and moderately signiﬁcant for fatigue (F¼ 5.08; df¼ 1,
30; p5 0.05). Interactions between functional role and any other independent
variable were not observed. The data for all three subjective measures are presented
in ﬁgure 3.
3.4.3. Team evaluation questionnaire. ANOVAs were carried out on four sub-scales of
the questionnaire to identify any eﬀect of cognitive diversity on team evaluation. The
analysis revealed little awareness of cognitive diversity among TMs (neither for system
understanding nor for team specialization), with all tests of main eﬀects and interactions
showing non-signiﬁcant results. For the subscale level of diversity, even a single item
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Figure 3. Ratings of subjective state measures (0–100) as a function of time on task and
functional role for (a) mental eﬀort, (b) anxiety, and (c) fatigue. T0¼prior to task session;
T30¼ 30 min into task; T60¼ 60 min into task.
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analysis (within-team diﬀerences in task management strategies, in system knowledge and
in overall performance) showed no signiﬁcant eﬀects (all F5 1).
3.5. Communication patterns and social conﬂict
3.5.1. Videotape analysis. Overall, the videotape analysis showed that within-team
communication was largely task-related. The main topic of within-team communication
was intervention measures (5.69 communicative acts/min), followed by fault diagnosis
(1.34/min) whilst other issues featured much less prominently in within-team conversa-
tion. This includes communication topics such as CAMS task (0.77/min), secondary tasks
(0.71/min) and personal matters (0.40/min). Interestingly, there was very little explicit
communication about the allocation of tasks between TMs (0.06/min) and little reference
was made to the content of the training received (0.16/min).
ANOVA was carried out on the aggregated communication frequency score
(see table 4), revealing an eﬀect of system understanding that showed more com-
munication in SOT-teams than in the other two (F¼ 3.94; df¼ 2, 21; p5 0.05; LSD-test:
p5 0.05). The analysis also provided evidence for more within-team communication
for non-specialized teams than for specialized ones (F¼ 4.84; df¼ 1, 21; p4 0.05). With
regard to fault type, there was no diﬀerence between the three fault types (PracF 9.24/
min; CPF1 9.44/min; CPF2 10.14/min; F¼ 2.75; df¼ 2, 42; p4 0.05). No interaction was
recorded. Separate ANOVAs were carried out on each of the eight communication
topics. Two of them (intervention and secondary task) showed a similar pattern to the
aggregated communication frequency score, whereas for the other categories no eﬀects of
the independent variables were found.
3.5.2. Social conﬂict questionnaires. Levels of conﬂict within the team were generally
very low, as the ratings of the FAKT questionnaire have indicated. The mean rating
across all scales for the whole sample was 1.66 on a scale ranging from 1 to 5. Only one of
the sub-scales (conﬂict due to interdependence) showed a higher rating (mean 2.78).
ANOVA showed no eﬀects of cognitive diversity, neither for system understanding
(F5 1), nor for specialization (F5 1).
3.6. System knowledge
The data collected by the knowledge questionnaire were analysed for individual
TMs (i.e. n¼ 72). Each proposition made by a TM about CAMS was scored with
regard to its correctness (maximum score was 33). The analysis revealed that
SOT-TMs made a higher number of correct propositions (mean 16.0) than POT-TMs
(mean 12.9). This diﬀerence in the quality of explicit system knowledge was signiﬁcant
Table 4. Communication frequency (communicative acts/min) as a function of system
understanding and team specialization.
System-oriented
training
Procedure-oriented
training
Mixed
team Overall
Overall 11.67 8.82 8.43
Team specialization 10.01 7.86 7.99 8.62
No team specialization 13.75 9.77 9.17 10.95
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(F¼ 7.42; df¼ 1, 65; p5 0.005). There was no diﬀerence as a function of specialization
(generalists: mean 14.4; specialists: mean 14.3; F5 1) and no interaction was observed
(F5 1). Separate analyses of the two sections of the knowledge questionnaire (multiple
choice and open questions) provided the same pattern of results; that is, an eﬀect of
system understanding but none of specialization.
4. Discussion
The study aimed to investigate the eﬀects of two types of cognitive diversity on team
performance in a technical work environment: system understanding and team
specialization. The data analysis revealed a number of interesting results, which may
be summarized into four major points. First, there were diﬀerences in performance
between the two types of cognitive diversity. Diversity in system understanding showed
some advantages over homogeneous teams, whereas no such eﬀect was observed for
diversity in team specialization. Second, the results indicated that the eﬀects of cognitive
diversity were moderated by task complexity, with only complex tasks beneﬁting from
cognitive diversity whilst more simple tasks were unaﬀected. Third, typical problems
associated with diversity (e.g. increased conﬂict) were not observed, with levels of conﬂict
being generally rather low. Fourth, diverse teams were, surprisingly, not aware of their
diversity. These main ﬁndings are now discussed in more detail.
The results for diversity in system understanding partly supported the assumption that
diverse teams were superior to homogeneous ones. As expected, the MIX-teams showed a
signiﬁcantly higher performance than the POT-teams. In contrast to expectations, there
were no diﬀerences between MIX-teams and SOT-teams. These results suggest that
Steiner’s (1972) disjunctive task principle has been applicable to teamwork in a task
environment such as CAMS. As the disjunctive task principle proposes that the best
TM determines overall team eﬀectiveness, this means in the present study that within
MIX-teams the SOT-TM determined team performance and, therefore, the performance
of the MIX-teams was similar to the SOT-teams rather than the POT-teams.
However, at this point one needs to explore why MIX-teams did not beneﬁt as
much from their diversity as expected. Because of the overall low level of conﬂict
observed, the ‘process loss’-explanation (Milliken and Martins 1996) can be discounted,
which suggests that diversity is associated with certain costs (e.g. conﬂict or
communication problems) that oﬀset some of its advantages. Instead, the pattern of
results might be explained as follows. More beneﬁts of diversity in system understanding
would have been found if a broader range of working conditions had been simulated,
allowing POT-TMs to make more use of their performance potential. The working
conditions simulated in the present study may not have been suﬃciently favourable for
POT to beneﬁt. For example, if environmental stressors such as noise are present, POT
may have had advantages over SOT, as has been demonstrated in a previous study
(Hockey et al. 2005). This was because POT has led to cognitively less demanding control
strategies, requiring fewer cognitive resources for task completion and, hence, task
performance was less vulnerable to environmental stressors than performance of
operators having received SOT. As no such adverse working conditions were present
in the current study, it was not possible to demonstrate the diﬀerential beneﬁts of POT
for performance in diverse teams.
Despite the absence of these diﬀerential beneﬁts for POT-teams, some evidence for the
utility of POT was provided by the data on the eﬃciency of system management
behaviour. This manifested itself in more eﬃcient system control strategies for
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POT-teams and MIX-teams (due to their procedure-trained TM) compared to
SOT-teams, with intervention eﬃciency being measured by the number of system control
actions to achieve system stability. Whilst intervention eﬃciency is not a primary task
goal, it may be considered a secondary aspect of successful system management since it
allows the conservation of operator resources and the reduction of machine wear.
More frequent system intervention shown by system-trained operators compared to
procedure-trained operators has also been found in a comparative study (Sauer et al.
2000a). This diﬀerence between training regimes may be due to two factors. First,
SOT-teams were not given a set of eﬀective procedures to deal with fault scenarios so that
they had to develop their own, which they derived from their overall system
understanding. These were generally not as eﬃcient (in the sense of minimizing the
number of interventions) as the ones given to the POT-teams. Second, SOT encouraged
operators to explore the system’s properties, which has led to interventions that were not
absolutely necessary but may have improved their general understanding of the system.
The procedure-trained TM in the MIX-team supported the system-trained TM in ﬁnding
more eﬃcient intervention strategies that allowed the MIX-team to achieve the same
performance levels as the SOT-team while accomplishing that goal more eﬃciently.
In contrast to diversity in system understanding, there were no beneﬁts for diversity in
team specialization, with the system stabilization measure even showing advantages for
the homogeneous, that is, non-specialized teams. The generalist teams may have beneﬁted
from a broader knowledge of CAMS because they were trained on a larger number of
system faults. In contrast, team specialization did not provide any advantages because
TMs did not communicate as much as needed to ensure that they made best use of their
team resources. Furthermore, it is conceivable that training may have led to the
unintended side eﬀect that specialists were more similar to POT-teams with regard to
fault management strategies (i.e. strong proceduralization because they practised few
fault states very intensively) and generalists were more similar to SOT-teams (i.e. broader
system understanding because they were trained on a larger number of system faults but
practised these less thoroughly).
All eﬀects of cognitive diversity were observed in the more complex primary tasks while
no such eﬀects were found for the less complex secondary tasks (complexity may be
deﬁned here as the training time required for the operator to achieve satisfactory
performance levels). The fault diagnosis task appears to be the most complex task in
the simulation environment because it involves the storage and retrieval of complex
information (e.g. fault symptoms and step-by-step procedures for fault recovery),
requiring a substantial amount of training. Being perhaps of only slightly lesser
complexity, the system control task represents a tracking task comprising ﬁve
interdependent tracking loops, with particularly high information-processing demands
arising during the management of CPF. By contrast, both secondary tasks are not
inherently complex as training requirements are minimal for both of them (i.e. operators
can successfully complete the annunciator acknowledgement task as well as the logging
task after a few minutes of practice). This is not to say that these tasks are undemanding
since they are to be completed as part of a multiple-task environment requiring
careful allocation of attentional resources. In particular, the prospective memory task is
characterized by heavy working memory demands. However, due to the low complexity
of the secondary tasks, the team is unlikely to beneﬁt from cognitive diversity during their
completion. These ﬁndings correspond to other work, which suggests that complex
tasks beneﬁt more from cognitive diversity than simple tasks (e.g. Mohammed and
Ringseis 2001).
950 J. Sauer et al.
The diﬀerences between primary and secondary tasks may also be demonstrated by
referring to the classiﬁcation system of Straus and McGrath (1994). The two primary
tasks embedded in CAMS may be considered intellective tasks; that is, they require the
identiﬁcation of the correct solution to a problem (e.g. which sequence of control actions
needs to be carried out to stabilize the CPF). By contrast, the two secondary tasks have a
strong focus on the implementation of routine action sequences (‘execute’ in the model of
Straus and McGrath). The model may also help make a prediction for the eﬀects of
diversity in system understanding when even more complex tasks are to be completed.
While there have been eﬀects of cognitive diversity for intellective tasks, one may
speculate that for even more complex tasks, such as judgements tasks, the beneﬁts of
cognitive diversity would be even greater. This is because judgement tasks do not have a
correct answer to a problem (e.g. whether a nuclear power plant be shut down after an
accident). Therefore, beliefs, attitudes and values play a much stronger role in
the decision-making process, with the discussions gaining from more diverse views
within the team.
In contrast to some research that found increasing social conﬂict to be one of the
negative side-eﬀects of diversity (Jehn et al. 1997, Pelled et al. 1999), cognitive diversity
was no cause for conﬂict in this study, as shown by the data from the conﬂict
questionnaire FAKT and the videotape. The absence of conﬂict may be partly due to the
kind of tasks embedded in the CAMS environment. The factors typically observed as
causes for conﬂict in teams (e.g. diﬀerent views on the best task management approach;
Jehn and Mannix 2001) are more likely to have an eﬀect on judgement tasks than on
intellective or execute tasks, which were the two types of tasks embedded in CAMS. The
type of tasks used in the present study may therefore have contributed to the very low
prevalence of conﬂict. A second possible cause for the low prevalence of conﬂict referred
to system management strategies used by teams. Any idea generated by a TM to deal with
an unknown fault state was usually put to the test without delay to check whether it was
eﬀective, suggesting the prevalence of an action-oriented system management approach.
If the tested plan of action turned out to be ineﬀective, a test of an alternative plan of
action could immediately follow. In a more reﬂective system management approach a
number of ideas would have been collected ﬁrst, followed by an evaluation of their
eﬀectiveness before the most promising one would have been implemented. The reﬂective
approach is expected to create more conﬂict within teams. However, this approach was
hardly used because there was a need for rather rapid decision-making processes, which
was due to the system state of CAMS constantly changing (even in the absence of
operator intervention).
While there was no eﬀect of diversity on conﬂict, some diﬀerences in communication
patterns were found between groups. Members of SOT-teams communicated more
frequently with each other than members of MIX- and POT-teams. This may be because
members of SOT-teams were encouraged during their training to think about the system
and its components. This more thorough thinking process, if done aloud in a team,
may have increased the communication rate but, with communication being a two-
way process, only when both TMs had received system-based training. This may
explain why the communication rate dropped during the presence of two or even one
POT-TM.
Interestingly, within diverse teams there was a rather low awareness of their diversity,
as the data collected by the team evaluation questionnaire had demonstrated. This was
supported by the ﬁndings from the video analysis, which showed that within the
diverse teams, the diﬀerent training methods were very rarely the subject of team
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communication. Both data sources, questionnaire and video analysis, provided
evidence for a poor transactive memory within these teams, which refers to the level of
knowledge of TMs about their within-team resources (see Wegner 1986). This
poor transactive memory has probably contributed to specialized teams not making
eﬀective use of their expertise, as they may not have assigned the task to the most
eﬀective TM. A prerequisite for eﬀective team performance is that the proﬁle of
strengths and weaknesses for each TM are known within the group (e.g. Cannon-Bowers
et al. 1993). A further prerequisite is that the task is carried out by the more competent
TM to make the best use of team skills (i.e. the less competent TM must not dominate
the team).
The quality of the transactive memory is inﬂuenced by the duration of shared task
involvement of the team. Because of TMs having worked together for only 1 h in the
present study, there has only been very limited time for gaining a good knowledge
of overall group resources. This may not be a problem in some technical work
environments, where roles are very clearly deﬁned, so that such adaptation processes are
not really needed (McGrath et al. 1995). However, in those technical work environments
in which a substantial transactive memory is required, one needs to be aware that it takes
generally more time to develop a shared mental model in teams operating technical
systems than in other work groups, such as task forces and management teams (McGrath
et al. 1995).
The study also provided some interesting ﬁndings concerning the eﬀects of teamwork
on subjective operator state. A surprising result was that the functional role assigned to
the operator had a great impact on their subjective state. The purpose of assigning these
functional roles was to balance out the inﬂuence of TMs during task completion while it
was emphasized that participants should work as equal TMs. While team eﬀectiveness
models acknowledge the important part that TM roles play for overall team performance
(Tannenbaum et al. 1992), this result shows that even temporary minor roles (e.g. having
strict responsibilities assigned in task completion to avoid diﬀusion of responsibility) may
substantially increase operator strain.
In addition to subjective operator state being aﬀected by functional roles, ratings of all
three state variables (fatigue, eﬀort and anxiety) were found to increase as the working
session progressed. Rising levels of fatigue as a result of increasing time-on-task were not
unexpected and have been found in comparative studies (e.g. Sauer et al. 2003).
Somewhat rarer were increases in mental eﬀort expenditure to respond to augmenting
work demands since the strategy is typically only applied to cope with short-term peak
demands, as an extensive use of that strategy may risk a complete depletion of the
operator’s resource pool (Hockey 1997). In the present case, demands associated with the
coordination of teamwork may have contributed to the observed increase in eﬀort
expenditure. Most surprising was, however, that anxiety levels increased in the present
study, although in comparative studies examining single operator performance no such
increase in anxiety was measured (e.g. Sauer et al. 2002). The increasing anxiety may be
attributed to the presence of a second operator and may be interpreted as evaluation
apprehension within the context of social facilitation theory (Cottrell et al. 1968). As
performance levels could only be maintained by increasing eﬀort expenditure, TMs may
have felt more anxious about successful task completion because their performance was
monitored by their team mate.
The article closes with a discussion of the issue of cognitive diversity in a broader
context. The present study has extended the focus of previous work by including aspects
of cognitive diversity that refer to permanent features of a team’s mental model rather
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than temporary features. This is an important point since it may dissolve the seeming
contradiction between the research literature that advocates that mental models need to
be strongly shared and the ﬁndings of the present study arguing for the beneﬁts of
diversity in system understanding. On the basis of the beneﬁts found for diversity, it could
be argued that the potential of cognitive diversity may be even larger under more
favourable circumstances. There may be three factors that help create more favourable
conditions for cognitively diverse teams. Two of them (a good transactive memory and
suﬃciently complex tasks) have already been discussed but a third, of no lesser
importance, refers to the degree of interdependence between TMs for achieving task
goals. TM interdependence was low in this study because each TM would have been able
to carry out all given tasks alone (albeit at the cost of excessive workload). If there had
been a higher level of interdependency between TMs (such as in distributed systems), one
would expect to ﬁnd an increase in the advantages of cognitive diversity. Overall,
cognitive diversity appeared to be a promising concept to convey the idea of team
diversiﬁcation to achieve performance improvements.
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